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 The Monhantic Fort site on the Mashantucket Pequot reservation in southeastern 
Connecticut has yielded many insights into Pequot life in the late 17th century. This 
fortified village, occupied during King Philip’s War, has given archaeologists a glimpse 
of the domestic practices and organization of the people who lived within as well as 
details about how they engaged with military expeditions. In this thesis, I examine the 
lithic assemblage from Monhantic Fort. This assemblage, comprised of European flint 
employed to create tools like gunflints and strike-a-lights, can be used to investigate how 
the Pequots utilized new stone tool technologies and negotiated these technologies with 
pre-contact practices of lithic tool making. The first issue my thesis explores is aw 
material availability, as other sites have suggested that European flint was a scarce raw 
material in 17th century New England. The second issue concerns the retention of pre-
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contact Native practices of lithic production and maintenance. By analyzing the flakes 
and debitage recovered from different areas at the fort, one can see whether or not the 
Mashantucket Pequot had adopted specialization in production and maintenance of stone 
tools and where these activities were taking place. The evidence from both the artifacts 
and the documentary record demonstrates that raw material availability was not  
problem for the Mashantucket Pequot living at the fort. It also shows that production and 
maintenance were not specialized activities, but that some households did have a more 
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The 1991 testing and excavation of site 72-91 by the University of Connecticut 
field school and the Public Archaeology Survey Team (PAST) was focused on an 
eighteenth-century farmstead on the Mashantucket Pequot reservation in southeastern 
Connecticut. However, their efforts began turning up seventeenth-century artifacts 
instead of eighteenth-century ones. The notion of a seventeenth-century site in the area 
was initially ignored until aboriginal ceramics forced the archaeologists to acknowledge a 
seventeenth-century occupation (McBride 2006: 321). An unexpected find would then 
change their impression that this might have been only a small seventeenth-c ntury site: 
linear perpendicular features that met at a corner, what was realized to b  the remains of 
the palisade line from a fort. The focus of the excavation for the next few years b came 
the investigation of this Native fort’s architecture and interior, revealing domestic 




Figure 1: The Mashantucket Pequot Reservation.  
Image Courtesy of the Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center. 
 
McBride (2006: 321) believes the integrity at the fort site to be excellent, citi g
the fact that the site was never plowed and that the original palisade trench is still visible 
as a continuous stain 10-15 centimeters below the surface. Only two intrusions have 
gotten in the way; a tree and an eighteenth-century stone wall have thus far prevented 
excavation of the northeast bastion. After the discovery of the fort, a search of the 
historical record let the archaeologists at the Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research 
Center know what they were dealing with: a fort dating to King Philip’s War that was 
associated with the sachem Robin Cassacinamon. Monhantic Fort was the name given to 
the fort. 
Monhantic Fort has yielded a plethora of information about life for the 
Mashantucket Pequot in the late seventeenth century. As a fortified village, the wigwam 
sites within and the artifacts recovered from them have given Pequot Museum 
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archaeologists a clearer picture of the Pequot subsistence economy, land-use practic s, 
and even gender roles during King Philip’s War (Benard 2005; McBride 2006: 327-328). 
In addition, the military artifacts from the site allow insights into the ways that the Pequot 
utilized various weapons and how they went to war. One kind of military artifact, the 
gunflint, is especially important as its manufacture and use life is connected to a 
technology that was integral to Native life not only during the seventeenth century bu  
also during the pre-contact era. Gunflints have thus been tied to issues like the ret ntion 
of Native practices, the negotiation of new things and technologies, and in the case of the 
Mashantucket Pequot, the extent of European influence on Native groups (Kenmotsu 
1990; Luedtke 1999b; Nassaney and Volmar 2003; Williams 2011). 
 
Lithic Technology at Monhantic Fort 
 Gunflints and other stone tools from Monhantic Fort can improve our 
understanding of these issues. Until the early seventeenth-century, Native Americans in 
the Northeast had utilized a wide variety of raw materials when producing sto e tools. In 
the case of gunflints and strike-a-lights, the two kinds of flaked stone tools recve d at 
Monhantic Fort and associated with European material technologies, European flint was 
the ideal raw material as it best produced the sparks that these tools were design d to 
create. However, Native people were also known to use chert and quartz, both materials 
that were locally available and familiar, when making these items (Calogero 2002; 
Luedtke 1998; Potter 1998; Williams 1973). As just one group of consumers of European 
flint, the Pequots would have had to traverse the colonial economy for access to it.  
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Scarcity of European flint in the late seventeenth-century has been theorized by 
Luedtke (1998) during her study of the lithic assemblage from the Aptucxet Trading Post. 
Studies have shown that Native people in New England were able to negotiate the new 
colonial economies quite well; a lack of flint scarcity may be another indicator that the 
Pequot were well schooled in navigating colonial Connecticut and beyond for the 
material goods they needed, especially in a time of war when the demand for the god in
question was likely to have been high (Loren 2008: 52; Nassaney 2004: 346). A lack of 
raw material scarcity may also indicate that European flint was only a scarce material in 
certain contexts; such an interpretation would be important for archaeologists doing 
research on lithic assemblages that contain European flint and gunflints to keep in mind.  
 Additionally, the lithics at the Fort can also be utilized to investigate the 
continuation of pre-contact Native technological practices and the potential European 
effects on them. Stone tool production and maintenance were not a specialized activities 
for Native Americans in the Northeast, but Europeans required specialists to produce 
gunflints and stone tools as lithic technology was not something familiar to them 
(Howlett 2004; Nassaney 2004). As a result, distinguishing the identities of those w  
made the gunflints found archaeologically is an important research question. 
Archaeologists have shown the retention of pre-contact methods through the way Native 
peoples manufacture their gunflints; however, the practice of making them has been 
called into question in the case of the Mashantucket Pequot (Kenmotsu 1990; Luedtke 
1999b; Williams 2011). By examining the flakes and debitage, we can see if the pre-
contact practice of making and rejuvenating one’s own tools, whether gunflints or 
otherwise, was still in play for the Pequots at Monhantic Fort, or if stone tool pr duction 
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and maintenance had been turned over to specialists. In addition, the documentary record 
can help determine if there was a strong European presence at the Fort, and if this may 
have influenced whether or not specialization in lithic technology took place there and by 
whom. The relationship between the products of this technology, the gunflints, and 
objects of weaponry may also illuminate this issue. If gunflints are seen as extensions of 
the weapons they will become a part of, their production and maintenance may parallel
the specialized production and maintenance of weapons, rather than stay linked to 
everyday practices of lithic production and use for household needs. 
 
Broader Implications 
The assertion that the Mashantucket Pequot may have adopted specialization in 
lithic technology and that this specialization was an adaptation due to intensive European 
influence on the reservation makes the situation at Monhantic Fort very complex. The 
introduction of specialized activity spaces for lithic technology would suggest an 
alteration in Native practices displayed through a different way of using space, with 
implications for the construction of identity as senses of self result from the ways people 
move through space. Additionally, a strong European presence and influence would 
indicate a more intense struggle against colonialism, since the reservation w s the locus 
for resistance and residence for Native people in the colonial world (Den Ouden 2005: 
15; Loren 2008: 59).  
 Lithic technology has been utilized by several archaeologists to address larger 
issues in the contact and colonial eras in North America. Despite the fact that me al 
counterparts to lithic tools were frequently incorporated by Native Americans, the decline 
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of lithic production and use was not immediate nor inevitable, and their persistence and 
the timing of their disappearance have implications for several aspects of Native cultures 
and have to be considered in light of economic and social variables (Cobb 2003: 2). 
Lithics that persist in the face of metal counterparts have been interpreted as a way of 
asserting Native identity and cultural practice in the colonial world; Si liman (2003: 149), 
for example, has shown that the continued use of stone tools in Native American homes 
in nineteenth-century California represented a way for the Native people, particularly 
men, to separate their domestic lives from their work spaces and maintain their dentities 
in a multi-ethnic location. 
Other studies have detailed how the continued use of stone tools was a way for 
Native Americans to resist pressures brought on by colonialism. They were abl to 
maintain traditional symbolic practices like smoking through stone pipes and could use 
tools like pipes and pestles to reinforce Native notions of gender in the face of 
colonialism’s transformative forces (Nassaney and Volmar 2003: 91; Wagner 2003: 1 5). 
These kinds of studies have shown that stone tools are a variety of material culture that 
could be used by indigenous groups to maintain identity, fight against the forces of 
colonialism, and negotiate changes taking place within. At the same time, this rsearch 
reveals that the use of stone tools by Native Americans may draw out connections to their 
past practices, but it may also position a once-traditional practice in a new co text, such 
as that of colonial labor (e.g., Cassell 2003, Silliman 2001) or, in this case, new firearms 
and their maintenance. 
Interpretations have also been made by archaeologists studying lithic technology 
regarding identity and its expression through stone tools. The identity of the tool’s creator 
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is seen to be expressed in the product, even if the signaling of identity was not an 
intentional part of the production process (Odess 1998; Wobst 1977, 1999). This is not to 
say that the material item itself is what signals cultural context; rather, identity can be 
expressed in the way a tool is produced spatially and materially. Archaeologists studying 
gunflints have gravitated toward this logic when making distinctions between Native and 
European produced flints. 
As Amy Den Ouden (2005: 5) has noted, the persistence of indigenous identities 
is key to Native Americans and their struggles for history and autonomy. One of the 
major obstacles that Native peoples face is the concept that they have somehow lost their 
traditional cultures and become less Native, a concept which is utilized to deny the 
authenticity of Native identities (Den Ouden 2005: 5-6; Loren 2008: 20). It has been 
argued that Native identity is compromised or lost altogether when traditions, 
technologies, and cultural forms introduced by Europeans are integrated into Native 
cultures (Den Ouden 2005: 19). These arguments manifest in the discipline with the 
notion of the “Vanishing Indian” and with historical archaeology focusing on indige ous 
sites becoming historic (a.k.a. more European) ones, with the loss of the indigenous label 
insinuating a loss of indigenous people (Carlson 2006: 195; Den Ouden 2005: 17; 
Ferguson 1996: 65; Nassaney 2004: 335). A common application of such an argument 
usually relates to the adoption of European manufactured objects. As Chapter Two points 
out, Native groups incorporated several European manufactured tools and counterparts to 
Native tools in the seventeenth century. Gunflints were a European introduced tool tied t  
a lithic technology possessed by both groups, and they could certainly be used in such an 
argument. This is especially true of the gunflints from Monhantic Fort, considering the 
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perception held by some that King Philip’s War was the last stand of the Indians and that 
they ceased to be Indians once they stopped fighting (Den Ouden 2005: 18).  
However, as Silliman (2009: 214) points out, Native people did not change simply 
because they started using European manufactured items and technologies. In the ame 
vein, Loren (2008: 5) has noted that overlooking and simplifying interactions and use of 
material culture in constituting identities in the colonial world sits at the root of the 
problem. The colonial world is many things, but it is not simple; things are almost always 
complex, even if they do not seem to be at first glance. European manufactured or 
introduced materiality incorporated into Native societies have come to be seen as 
European objects utilized in Native ways or European goods becoming Native materials 
(Loren 2008: 53; Silliman 2009: 225-227). Again, as will be mentioned in Chapter Two, 
Native peoples have been shown to have created stone tools using pre-contact 
methodology in the seventeenth century. They were using Native ways to make their 
gunflints, tools that were European introduced but were now distinctly Native in orig
and practice. This thesis engages with the notion that these may express Native identity, 
at least in the sense of individuals applying long-standing technologies and practices to 
the production of weaponry for protecting a community in a militarized decade of 
colonial New England history. 
 
Structure of the Study 
This study attempts to answer the questions drawn from the issues above. 
Answering these questions will involve investigating whether or not European flint was 
the only raw material in use at the Fort, studying locations of lithic production and 
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maintenance, examining gunflints to see if they were given priority in manufacture over 
strike-a-lights as would have been necessary in the event of flint scarcity, evaluating the 
intensity of use and rejuvenation of gunflints, and evaluating lithic spatial paterns with 
respect to objects of weaponry. Much of this relies on archaeological data, but historical 
documents have been consulted as well to bring larger sets of information to bear on 
these questions. These questions in turn will aid in addressing larger issues of lithic tools 
and Native American negotiations in colonial New England.  
As the Monhantic Fort lithic assemblage is explored, one can evaluate how 
scarcity (or lack thereof) of the raw material and how tools like gunflints were produced 
and maintained relate to the issues presented above. In Chapter Two, the historical 
context for the fort site and its lithic assemblage is established. Chapter Three then 
follows with an investigation of the documentary record. Pertinent documents are 
analyzed to see if they can provide evidence to help answer the questions addressed by 
this thesis. Chapter Four contains a description of the methodology employed in the 
examination of the archaeological material, with the data resulting from this examination 
presented in Chapter Five. Finally, Chapter Six discusses the results of the analysis and 








CHAPTER II  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Late Woodland Connecticut 
 Native peoples in southern New England were already amid a time of transition 
before the arrival of Europeans to the New World. Changes in subsistence strategies 
brought about by the introduction of intensive maize horticulture had necessitated 
alterations in Native settlement patterns over the last millennium (McBride 1994: 8-10). 
Previously, settlement patterns had reflected the seasonal movement involved with 
subsistence based around hunting and gathering; however, the Late Woodland period 
(1000 to 400 BP) saw a decline in seasonal settlements as Native people began shifting 
toward permanent and semi-permanent villages (Leveillee et al. 2006; Loren 2008: 31; 
McBride 1992: 14). This high degree of sedentism would have been essential in 
horticulture of key plant foods like maize, beans, and sunflower (McBride 1994: 10). 
This transition did not eliminate hunting activities, of course. The increase of villages 
went hand in hand with the increase in seasonal camps and task specific sites (McBride 
1992: 14). At the same time, Native people began to orient themselves into smaller, 
family groups. These changes all culminated with Native groups largely living in villages 
centered around small seasonal camps, a settlement pattern that matches historic 
descriptions of Native settlements along the coast (McBride 1994: 10; McBride and 
Bellantoni 1982: 63). 
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 The Late Woodland period also saw changes in stone tool production that resulted 
in what Jeske (1992) refers to as the “degeneration of lithic technology.” There was a 
decline in both the diversity of stone tools and the energy Native people were willing to 
expend on them. Bipolar reduction techniques allowed Native people to maximize flake 
yields from small cores, reducing the demand for raw material. Natives also practiced 
intensive maintenance of lithic tools, retouching them rather than replacing them (Jeske 
1992: 469, 472). These lithics consisted of tools like knives, scrapers, and projectile 
points, the latter especially in the case of the Pequot, who appear to have had a 
resurgence in hunting activities during this time (Jones 2002: 23).The other major 
development in the Late Woodland was long distance trade networks falling into disuse. 
The inhabitants of New England had in the past imported raw material like chert for use 
in lithic production, but as populations became more sedentary, Native people began to 
favor locally available stone, from which there was a wide variety to choose, although of 
variable knapping quality (Calogero 2002: 102; Jeske 1992: 469; Ritchie 2002: 108). The 
Pequots, for example, increased their use of local quartzes and quartzites to the point 
where nonlocal stone made up less than 5% of their assemblages, where it had been 
previously been 80-90% (McBride 1992: 16; McBride 1994: 14). 
 
“A very warlike and potent people” 
 The Pequots were well established by the Late Woodland, having become one of 
the principal nations of New England. Daniel Gookin (1972: 7) described them as being 
“a very warlike and potent people,” with control over the Connecticut Valley and the 
coastline from New Haven to Rhode Island (Cave 1989; McBride 1994: 13; Starna 1990: 
34). This domination had apparently been gained through warfare, as the Pequots had 
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been engaged in hostilities with the Mohawks and Narragansetts, their neighboring tribes. 
Such hostilities led to both Gookin and Increase Mather giving them the reputation of 
being warlike and cruel (Gookin 1972: 7; Mather 1972: 24-26). At the same time, these 
descriptors of Natives like the Pequots as cruel and barbarous were essential to suring 
colonists regarded Indians as the enemies of civilization, and thus such adjectives are 
probably not completely representative of the Pequots at the time (Den Ouden 2005: 11-
12). Besides, they are references to social and physical violence, not to everyday lives of 
households and people. 
 By the time Europeans arrived, the Pequots were living in both fortified and 
unfortified villages based around agricultural fields (McBride 1993: 65-66). The 
utilization of wetland resources was also extremely important for the Pequot; while 
subsistence strategies and settlement patterns were changing during the Late Woodland, 
the number of sites adjacent to wetlands had remained constant. Areas at Mashantucket 
like the Great Cedar Swamp were ideal for hunting activities and gathering of certain 
plant resources, and such places were also known to be refuges for Native people during 
times of crisis (McBride 1992: 14, 19; Williams 1973: 150).  
 In addition, the Pequot already had an established tradition of wampum 
production. This control over wampum boosted their power in the region when wampum 
became an integral part of trade with the European newcomers in the seventeenth century 
(Loren 2008: 86; McBride 1994: 13). The Pequot were very keen to acquire new trade 
goods, a desire that manifested itself partly in the acquisition of metal counterparts to 
tools they already possessed. Many stone tools such as knives and axes were quickly 
replaced by metal counterparts, brass was utilized for projectile points instead of stone, 
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and the Pequots found the Dutch more than willing to part with guns, powder, and shot 
during trade (Cobb 2003: 4; Malone 1991: 40; Mather 1972: 53, 68; Nassaney and 
Volmar 2003: 78). Gookin (1972: 152) remarked that “since the English, Dutch, and 
French have trafficked with them, they generally disuse their former weapons.” Domestic 
lithic tools, such as scrapers, were also replaced by metal counterparts. Despite this, lithic 
tools persisted in the form of stone pipes and ground stone tools like pestles, and flaked 
stone tools persisted in the form of gunflints and strike-a-lights (Gary 2007: 109; 
Nassaney and Volmar 2003: 84). The technology behind such tools also persisted as 
Native peoples practiced working glass. For example, excavations at the adjac nt and 
culturally related Eastern Pequot reservation have revealed that some expedient lithic 
flake use, as well as at least nominal “lithic” flaking of window glass, could be found as 
late as the final quarter of the eighteenth century (Silliman 2009, personal 
communication).  
 
The Pequot War and Its Aftermath 
 While the Pequots were enjoying a boon from their prominence in trade with 
Europeans, insidious problems started to plague them as the seventeenth century carried 
on, the first of which was actual plague. European introduced diseases hit Native 
populations of New England hard, and the Pequot were no exception (Loren 2008: 61; 
McBride 1994: 16; Starna 1990: 44-46). The impact in disease caused a drastic reduction 
in population, and the Pequot could no longer raise the 4,000 men for war of which 
Gookin boasted them to previously be capable (Gookin 1972: 7). However, the Pequots 
still far outnumbered the English in the area (Mather 1972: 28).  
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Militarily speaking, the English were not initially a threat by themselves, but 
combined with other Native groups, they proved to be devastating. Tensions had been 
building between the indigenous groups of the region as they competed for wampum and 
trade dominance, especially between the Pequots and the Narragansetts. Matters for th  
Pequots were complicated by infighting between their sachem Sassacus and the offshoot 
Mohegans under Uncas (Hauptman 1990: 71; McBride 1994: 13). Conflict in the area 
came to a head when the Pequots were blamed for the murders of some Englishmen. The 
English allied themselves with the Mohegans and Narragansetts against the Pequot, and 
once the Pequot attacked the town of Wethersfield in 1637, war had exploded in 
Connecticut (Hauptman 1990: 71). The English and Native coalition decided to 
counterattack with an assault on the Pequot fort at Mystic. The events that unfolded were 
more a massacre than an assault, as the English attacked and set fire to the fort and the 
wigwams inside while the Narragansetts and Mohegans surrounded the area and 
prevented escape, all resulting in the deaths of many Pequot men, women, and children 
(Mather 1972: 31-32). 
The rest of the war did not go well for the Pequot, and they found themselves 
forced to surrender. The English declared the Pequot disbanded, outlawed the use of their 
tribal name and the continued use of their lands, and tried to have the remaining Pequots 
absorbed into the Mohegan and Narragansett groups (Hauptman 1990: 76; Mather 1972: 
39). These plans would not come to fruition for the English, however, and although the 
remaining Pequots were initially subservient to the Narragansetts and Mohegans, they 
were able to form two groups, re-establish autonomous Pequot communities, and gain 
reservation lands. The group under the Narragansetts was given a reservation on Long
15 
 
Pond in North Stonington and became the Eastern Pequot in 1683; the rest of the Pequot 
followed sachem Robin Cassacinamon to a five hundred acre reservation at Noank and 
became the Western Pequot (McBride 1990: 105; Silliman 2009). In 1666, they were 
granted two thousand more acres at Mashantucket, and became known as the 
Mashantucket Pequot rather than the Western Pequot (McBride 1990: 106). 
 
King Philip’s War  
 The years between the Pequot War of 1637 and the outbreak of King Philip’s War 
in 1675 were marked by tenuous relations between Native people in New England and 
English colonists. Tensions developed with the Narragansetts, the former allies of th  
English during the Pequot War, as they were upset over the distribution of wampum 
(Salisbury 1990: 87). Land disputes caused by colonial expansion were also a source of 
ongoing friction. The English believed that unless Indians improved and subdued the 
land, they could not rightfully claim it as theirs (Den Ouden 2005: 3; Salisbury 1990: 92; 
Silverman 2003: 511). To improve the land by English standards required a significant 
overhaul of Native social relations, especially concerning gender roles. Men had 
traditionally been the hunters and fishers, while women had been responsible for 
gathering and horticulture; the English wanted them to conform to “proper” gender roles, 
which meant transforming men into agricultural laborers and women into domestic 
specialists (Richmond and Den Ouden 2003: 184; Williams 1973). The Pequot, even as a 
friendly tribe with respect to English views for the latter half of the sevent enth-century, 
were constantly under pressure to surrender parcels of land, eventually giving up their 
land at Noank for a clear title to Mashantucket (McBride 1990: 106). 
16 
 
 To put it simply, Native people were becoming increasingly unhappy with their 
situation. One of the ways in which they were able to resist the pressures put on them by 
colonialism was through violent resistance, and in 1675 such resistance sparked another 
war (Silverman 2003: 513). Friction between the Plymouth government and Philip 
(Metacomet), the sachem of the Indians at Mount Hope, was exacerbated by th  dea h of 
a Christianized Indian named John Sassamon. Colonial officials suspected Philip as 
orchestrating the murder, and after receiving intelligence that he intended mischief, 
soldiers sent to prevent an uprising were attacked and war had again come to New 
England (Gookin 1972b: 440-441). Philip’s group was joined by several other tribes, 
including the Narragansett, in their efforts to combat the English colonies. 
 
Figure 2: Map of Southern New England Showing Tribal Groups in King Philip’s War  




 At first, the colonial authorities were unable to tell exactly which Native groups 
were aligned against them, or perhaps they just feigned this inability to creae a climate of 
fear of all Native peoples. Either way, to an English settler living in the colonies, it 
seemed like any tribe had the potential to be an enemy. In Connecticut, great care was 
taken to see which groups were friends and which were foes, and it soon became clear 
that the Pequot were in the former category. In early summer 1675, the Reverend Jams 
Fitch wrote to Secretary John Allyn that he had been “at Kossasinamun’s towne” and had 
been assured of the Pequots’ fidelity and that they would do as commanded (Trumbull 
1850, vol. 2: 336). The ramifications of having friendly tribes at their disposal did not go 
unnoticed; soon the colonial authorities were discussing ways to utilize them. Fitz-John 
Winthrop wrote his brother, Captain Wait Winthrop, about the possible use of the 
Pequots and the Mohegans, saying that they “may be of good use if securely managed, & 
will be usefull to send out in partyes or march a distance from ye body to clere up any
suspitious places.” However, he also cautioned that “good care must be had of their 
faythfullness, & tis good to suspect them a litle” (Winthrop 1947: 280). 
 Before long, it became common for the War Council of Connecticut to send 
requests for Pequots and Mohegans to join military expeditions, asking those in a position 
to do so to “encourage the Pequots and Mohegans to fall upon the enemie” or “continue 
offering their services in fighting.” The Connecticut authorities recognized the 
effectiveness of a joint English and Native force; Native warriors could scoutahead to 
report on enemy movements in the area and they could help English troops learn the 
“skulking way of war” that was so different from European warfare. Forces from 
Massachusetts that lacked Native warriors to fill this capacity often far d worse in battle 
18 
 
(McBride 2006: 326; Trumbull 1850, vol. 2). The Pequots were especially useful due to 
their strategic location on the frontier with the Narragansetts, acting as guards against 
attacks on Connecticut towns (Gookin 1972b: 437; McBride 2006: 327). By the end of 
the war, the Pequots had been involved in 24 expeditions against those identified as 
hostile Natives (McBride 2006: 325). 
 
Monhantic Fort  
 The Pequot had always gone to the Great Cedar Swamp in times of crisis, and this 
certainly qualified. At the outbreak of King Philip’s War in June of 1675, two separate 
communities lived on the Mashantucket reservation. One was led by the sachem Robin 
Cassacinamon, the other by a sachem named Daniel (McBride 1993: 66; McBride 2006: 
322). Such an arrangement eventually led to dispute over Pequot leadership after 
Cassacinamon’s death in 1692, but for now was working out amicably with Daniel 
following Cassacinamon’s orders (McBride 1993: 68). It was one of these two 
communities, the one led by Cassacinamon, that went to the swamp to create a fort to 
protect the people on the reservation. They built their fort on a peninsula that extended 
into the swamp, one that Native peoples in the region had been utilizing for 10,000 years 
(Jones 2002). The name for this peninsula, revealed in a nineteenth-century probate 
record, was “Monhantic” or “at the island” (Ledyard Probate 1861, vol. 2: 56-59; 
McBride 2006: 322). The site is known almost exclusively through archaeological, rather 
than archival, information, giving it special prominence in archaeology’s unique 




Figure 3: Monhantic Fort's Location on the Reservation.  
Image Courtesy of the Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center. 
 
 Fort Shantok, the fort of the neighboring Mohegan tribe in the mid seventeenth 
century, is representative of the more common Native fortified sites in the region 
(Williams 1973). Shantok and other Native forts had long-term occupations, with their 
intended longevities taken into consideration during construction. Monhantic Fort, on the 
other hand, was hurriedly constructed (McBride 2006: 323). The architecture represents a 
combination of European and Native elements. The design of the Fort entrance, for 
example, harkens back to the design of Mystic Fort during the Pequot War with its 
overlapping palisades (McBride 2006: 325). Other elements, such as the bastions, seem 
more European. This has led McBride (2006: 323) to postulate that the Pequot may have 
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been assisted in the design phase by the English. Based on artifact dating and 
stratigraphic analysis, the fort was occupied for not less than 18-24 months and not more 
than five years; such an occupation is more than fitting for the tribe considering King 
Philip’s War from 1675 to 1677 and the Pequots’ conflict with the Mohawks from 1677 
to 1680 (McBride 2006: 322). One storage pit and later refuse pit feature, Feature 92, 
seems to have been used for a continuous period of three years, based on distinct disposal 
episodes of faunal and botanical remains seen through eighteen strata (McBride 2006: 
327). 
 The fort was not solely a place to run to in case of an attack. In fact, it is not large 
enough to have housed the entire Mashantucket population, which is why it is believed to 
be associated with just one of the communities on the reservation (McBride 2006: 322). It
was a place where most could go in the event of attack, but more than that, it was home 
to several family groups with multiple wigwams enclosed inside. The fort was in essence 
a small fortified village among the other villages on the reservation. The archaeological 
evidence recovered therefore is illustrative of domestic activities and daily life on the 
reservation in the late seventeenth century. 
 This is not to say that military activities were not present at the fort. Many 
military artifacts were recovered including brass projectile points, metal knives, gun 
parts, and lead shot. In addition, more than three dozen gunflints as well as hundreds of 
associated flakes of European flint were recovered. A forge was present at the fort 
outside the northwest bastion where the modification of iron objects and possibly their 
production and the repair of firearms took place (McBride 2006: 330). References to a 
Pequot named Schadaub have been found indicated that he was “something of a dealer in 
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smithery” (Ford 1970). Schadaub may have been employed as a blacksmith at the fort as 
a young man, or the Pequots may have had a new tradition of smithing of their own; 
either way it seems likely that they had a blacksmith on site, and if they had, the forge 
represents a specialized activity area (McBride 2006: 329). 
 
Figure 4: European Flint at Monhantic Fort, Based on Excavations up to May 1997.  
Image Courtesy of the Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center. 
 
 
Flintlocks and Gunflints in the 17th Century 
 It is necessary to contextualize the intersection of lithic technology and firearms 
in seventeenth-century Pequot life. Flintlock weapons are not very complicated. A 
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gunflint, a shaped fragment of siliceous stone, is screwed down into the cock, and once 
the trigger is pulled, it strikes the frizzen and creates the sparks that ignite the powder and 
fire the gun (Luedtke 1999: 71-72). Flintlocks were faster and more dependable than the 
popular matchlock guns, but matchlocks were simpler to use and easier to maintain, and 
their use continued despite the wide availability of flintlocks. However, flintlocks were 
much better suited to warfare and hunting in the New World, and they not only became 
quickly adopted by colonists but also became sought after by Native peoples (Luedtke 
1998: 34). It was the weapon of choice in New England by the time King Philip’s War 
had broken out. 
 Owning a flintlock necessitated having the gunflints that were required to fire it. 
The standard gunflint that an English colonist would seek to use in a flintlock would have 
been the spall type gunflint. Spalls had a wedge shaped cross section, with the ridge 
created by the shape of the gunflint used as the striking platform. The production of spalls 
was a specialized activity performed by anyone who learned the requisite flintknapping 
skills; they were being produced in Europe and in the colonies by 1650 (Luedtke 1999b: 
34; Kenmotsu 1990). The unskilled took a different route in gunflint production. The 
“do-it-yourself” method involved smashing a nodule of flint and picking a piece most 
like a spall to chip and batter into a useable gunflint (Luedtke 1998: 41). These chipped 
flints, however, look very different than the spalls they were meant to emulate. 
 For Native Americans, flintknapping was a more familiar activity, as itwas one 
they had used to create a wide variety of tools from the early Pleistocene until at least the 
early seventeenth century, if not beyond in limited capacity. They used these familiar 
methods of stone tool manufacture when it came time to produce gunflints. The result 
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was a distinct style of gunflint, one that was bifacial like projectile points (Luedtke 
1999b: 33; Kenmotsu 1990). Contrary to the way an English person would, a Native 
person would probably not smash the nodule of flint during the production process. 
Rather, they would utilize soft hammer percussion and pressure flaking to make their 
bifacial flint (Luedtke 1998: 38). Native people were also less picky about the raw 
material used to produce a gunflint. Most of theirs were made on ballast flint, gathered 
from piles along the coast where ships once anchored, but they also would produce 
gunflints using chert and even quartz (Luedtke 1998: 35; Potter 1998: 62; Williams 1973: 
333). Some of this seemingly more indiscriminate use may relate to the relative 
unavailability of English flint nodules and the familiarity with the local geological 
landscape. 
 At Monhantic Fort, the gunflints recovered are mostly bifacial flints that 
demonstrate the continuation of Native methods of manufacture, although a few spalls 
were also found. In his M.A. thesis at the University of Connecticut, Scott Williams 
(2011) examined these gunflints to find out if they had been produced for specific types 
of flintlock weapons, since the size of gunflints typically depends upon the size of th  
lock they are intended to fit into. Assemblages such as the one from Aptucxet, a 
European inhabited trading post located on Cape Cod that has produced a great deal of 
data on gunflints, have revealed smaller gunflints that were intended for pistols and larger 
ones intended for muskets and carbines (Hamilton and Emery 1988; Luedtke 1998: 41). 
Williams concluded that the Pequots were producing gunflints much in the same way.  
In accordance with fellow University of Connecticut researcher Benard’s (2005) 
conclusions that there were distinct activity areas at the fort, Williams also pronounced 
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that all three areas he examined (two wigwam sites and the forge) were areas of lithic 
production. However, this conclusion was based on concentrations of flint and not spatial 
distributions of primary flakes. When one examines the fort, one sees that flint is found 
virtually everywhere that was excavated. Concentrations of flint are not enough t  
definitively label areas of gunflint production. Areas of lithic maintenance wer n ver 
investigated by Williams either, although he did believe that gunflints themselves were 
deposited inside the fort since personal gear discard usually does not take place in the 
field (Williams 2011: 64). Not many archaeologists have investigated areas of flint 
maintenance associated with gunflint use, since identification of resharpening flakes 
would be difficult in the cases of unskilled Englishmen chipping and battering the stones. 
Resharpening chips of flint were identified at Fort Shantok, however, where the 
Mohegans had taken up fortified residence earlier in the seventeenth century (Malone 
1991: 70).  
Finally, Williams also believed that lithic production in the forge represented “a 
European adaptation and specialist production” (Williams 2011: 63, 70). In the past, 
lithic production and maintenance were not specialized activities among Native peopl ; 
individuals would make stone tools as they needed them, likely crosscutting gender lines 
(Howlett 2004: 75; Nassaney and Volmar 2003: 80-81). This contrasts with the way the 
English produced gunflints as they had them imported from specialists in Europe or had 
local specialists make them. They only chipped and battered their own when they had no 
other choice, which produced rather crude objects. Williams essentially saw the 
continuation of both a general Native pattern in the lithic production he concluded was 
present at the wigwam sites and a European-influenced specialist pattern of lithic
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production he concluded was at the forge. This conclusion seems contradictory as it 
suggests that production of gunflints was a specialized activity and a non-specialized 
activity all at the same time. An analysis of the spatial distributions of the primary flakes 
should give more insight into this issue; in addition, analysis of spatial distributions of 
resharpening flakes will indicate whether maintenance of gunflints occurred, where such 
activities occurred, and whether or not it was a specialized activity. I consider this 











 Before analyzing the archaeological material from Monhantic Fort, the 
documentary record had to be surveyed to see if any insight into lithic industry or 
military emplacement at the site could be gained. Like most from this period, these 
documents all come from the Colony of Connecticut and Europeans, not the 
Mashantucket Pequots themselves, but by reading “against the grain” these documents 
can reveal information essential to this study (Green and Troup 1999: 179). In order to 
locate the pertinent documents, the archives at both the Connecticut State Library and the 
Mashantucket Pequot Museum and Research Center were examined. The records of the 
War Council of Connecticut during King Philip’s War were also located online, as they 
had been scanned and assembled by archivists, historians, and archaeologists working for 
the State Library and the University of Connecticut. Any documents referencing supplies, 
especially of flint, or friendly Native groups were examined in depth to see if they might 
illuminate the nature of lithic supply and practice of the Pequots at Monhantic Fort. 
 
Raw Material Availability 
 Investigations into assemblages of gunflints have brought up the question of 
whether or not flint was a scarce resource, as levels of material scarcity may have real 
implications for technology, use, and discard. Luedtke’s (1998: 43) research at Aptucxet 
showed that the flint assemblage there was comprised of very small flakes th t seemed to 
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indicate that knappers used the flint until it was too small to work further. Coupled with 
the notion that homemade gunflints produced from ballast flint resulted from the great r 
demand for gunflints than the imported supply of spalls, Luedtke was left wondering if 
scarcity of the raw material was a factor. Ballast flint was prevalent in the colonies, from 
both its status as a trade commodity and its having been left in rivers for future reuse, but 
its desirability was geographically widespread, to the point that Native people would go 
collect it and carry it back inland considerable distances (Luedtke 1998: 45-47; Potter 
1998: 53, 61). For the Pequots in King Philip’s War, such a scarcity would have been 
devastating if John Mason is to be believed. In a letter to John Allyn, he wrote that both 
the Pequots and Mohegans were in short supply of ammunition, and that “they are in 
great hazard should the enemy assault them and do not have the werewithe to defend 
themselves” (Mason 1924). Thus, one of the first steps in assessing production and 
maintenance of flint at Monhantic Fort must be investigating this issue of flint scarcity. 
 A good place to start is a recognition of how flint was acquired. As previously 
mentioned, trade provided one way to procure ballast flint, as did trips to a river or harb
and picking up any ballast flint left behind. However, an important aspect to remember 
when considering the Monhantic Fort is that it was constructed and occupied during a 
time of war, unlike Aptucxet, and it sat several miles from ballast flint deposits on the 
coast. This avenue to the coast would not have been a problematic one to travel, as the 
Niantics that lived in the area were a friendly tribe to both the English and the Pequot, 
and the Pequot at this point still had lands of their own on the coast at Noank (Trumbull 
1850, vol. 2:  441). If Mason was right about the Pequots’ supply problem, it did not last 
for long. The need for Pequot warriors on military expeditions meant that the War 
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Council of Connecticut was willing to supply them with whatever they needed to fight. A 
letter from Secretary Allyn to Reverend Fitch and Reverend Buckley illustrates this 
perfectly: “order the Commissary to furnish both Indians and English with such 
provisions and ammunition as you and they gauge necessary for that expedition.” Several 
other documents confirm that the Native groups allied with the English were being 
supplied by Connecticut at the colony’s expense (Trumbull 1850, vol. 2: 407). 
 However, being supplied by Connecticut did not mean that the Pequots had 
copious nodules of flint with which to produce gunflints. The notion that Indians, even 
friendly ones, were in possession of flintlock weapons greatly troubled the English 
colonists. They attempted to prevent Native people from arming in the 1620s by making 
it illegal to trade guns to them, arresting anyone who sold Indians arms or repaired arms 
for them (Church 1989: 23-24; Lewis 1893: 14). These efforts were blocked by traders 
willing to work outside the law, as well as by Native people enlisting the aid of Dutch 
traders in their quest to obtain arms and ammunition (Winthrop 1947). By the time of the 
Pequot War, the Pequots already had an adequate supply of guns, powder, and shot; later 
on during King Philip’s War, Gookin described the Connecticut Indian forces as “all 
being armed with guns” (Gookin 1972b: 445; Mather 1972: 28).  
While the English certainly attempted to deprive their enemies of access to arms 
and ammunition, the colony of Connecticut had a different stance when it came to Indian 
tribes that had proclaimed their fidelity. They were willing to allow friendly groups like 
the Pequots to have guns and ammunition, but with strict controls in place to monitor 
what they were being given and how much. The General Court of Connecticut still 
maintained the prohibition on the supply of arms and ammunition to Indians with the 
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exception of the War Council ordering someone to do so (Trumbull 1850, vol. 2: 271). 
When the War Council furnished the Pequots with weaponry, they gave them what they 
deemed necessary but were wary about giving too much. A letter sent to Reverend Fitch 
asking him to encourage the Pequots to fight on an expedition came with the caveat to 
“be careful what ammunition is put into their hands” (Trumbull 1850, vol. 2: 387). Guns 
and ammunition taken as spoils in battle were allowed to be kept, and many documents 
reveal that the Pequots did bring in a great deal of plunder, but Connecticut did not place 
controls on plunder in order to use it as an incentive for the Indians to fight (Saltonstall 
1676: 8; Trumbull 1850, vol. 2; Winthrop 1947).  
In addition to the controls on the supplies of the Pequot warriors, the Council also 
sought to control Monhantic Fort’s general supply of arms and ammunition. Both Robin 
Cassacinamon and Daniel petitioned the Governor to be permitted to strengthen 
themselves against the common enemy. At a meeting of the Governor and the Council, it 
was decided that “the Councill doe grant ten pownd of powder and bulletts or lead 
proportionable be lent to Robbin, to be kept in his forte as a magazeen for their necessary 
defence, not to be improved by them without they be assaulted by an enemie” (Trumbull 
1850, vol. 2). If the Pequots were being supplied with ballast flint, either individually or 
as a group, then such a supply would most certainly have been controlled.  
Or would it have been? None of the documents, whether about supplying or 
controlling the arms and ammunition of the Mohegans and Pequots, ever explicitly 
mention flint. In fact, the only outright mention of flint in the orders of the War Council 
concern the movement of general supplies, when they decide to send “three barrells of 
powder, seven hundred waight of lead, and a stock of flint to New London for the present 
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expedition” and “three barrells of powder, nine hundred waight of bulletts and stock of 
flint to go to defend the corne.” The expedition mentioned in the document is not 
specified as being a joint English and Native force (Trumbull 1850, vol. 2: 383-384). 
However, the fact that they separate flint here from ammunition and provisions seem to 
suggest that flint was not lumped in with those things automatically. What does this mean 
for the supply of flint to friendly Natives like the Pequots? It is, without question, integral 
to their continued fighting in the war, as flintlocks will not fire without them. So if it 
were in short supply, it stands to reason that it would be mentioned when the War 
Council sends orders to supply ammunition like powder and shot. However, it never is. 
This separation of flint from ammunition also seems to provide some insight into 
the attitude about flint. Ammunition is mentioned all the time, while flint hardly ever is 
mentioned unless it is important to the situation. The only other document thus far found 
that does mention it, other than account books that show how much was paid for 
imported flints, is Gookin’s history of the Christian Indians during King Philip’s War, 
where he tells a story about a fight that involved someone unable to fire because their 
flint has fallen out (Gookin 1972b: 479). While flint is certainly an essential part of the 
flintlock, it does not seem to be treated as such. This attitude probably means that access 
to flint was not being controlled as it was for guns, powder, and shot were, and it suggest  
that it was more available and easier to come by as well. This attitude on flint may also 
have translated to the Pequots; if so, such an attitude would have implications for flint 
and its relation to weaponry, which might distinguish it from previous Pequot 
experiences and attitudes toward lithic materials. The documentary evidence n total 
suggests that flint was not a scarce resource for the Pequots living at Monhantic Fort, and 
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that the acquisition of nodules of ballast flint for gunflint production would not have been 
problematic. 
 
European Presence and Influence 
“Remember us to Robbin and Mamoho and tell them we well accept of 
theire readiness to attend our orders, and shall keep it in remembrance for 
their future advantage, and order them to keep in the same readiness as 
formerly; and when there shall be occasion to imploy them, you must 
endeavoure to secure their wives and children” (Winthrop 1947: 4). 
 
This passage from a letter to Wait Winthrop from the General Court of 
Connecticut serves basically as a reply to an earlier letter, in which Robin Cassacinamon 
passed on the request to have the English secure their wives and children through 
Winthrop (Winthrop 1675). It has made quite an impression on McBride (2006), who has 
theorized that a garrison of English troops might have been stationed at or near 
Monhantic Fort to carry out such securing. After all, the Pequot women and children 
would need protection all the time, since the warriors were away on almost every 
expedition of the war. The close proximity of English troops at the fort would certainly 
explain the presence of the European influences on the fort architecture and to the 
specialization that Scott Williams (2011) believes can be seen archaeologically. Issues of 
specialization at the fort have thus been tied to the extent of English presence, and this
must be investigated to provide some idea of how much and what kind of influence might 
have been at the fort. 
 As previously mentioned, the fort occupied a valuable strategic location on the 
frontier from which the forces of Connecticut could go forth and assault the enemy. The 
documents suggest that at the very least, it was used in exactly this capacity, as a staging 
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point for military campaigns. Thomas Minor, commander of the dragoons in southeastern 
Connecticut, makes specific mention that “the armie marched of from mashantuckset” in 
one of his diary entries (Minor 1993). Another document, a letter to Major Tallcott from 
the War Council, reveals that the allied Indians, who just returned from an expedition, 
were unwilling to go out on another until they visit home (Trumbull 1850, vol. 2: 455). 
The Council instructs Tallcott to take the English with them and set out from there as 
soon as possible. 
Is there enough evidence to say that there was more than just occasional European 
presence at the fort, though? One War Council document mentions that Tallcott and his 
men were frequently at Stonington with the Pequots and Mohegans, and Minor has 
several other entries in his diary saying he was at Mashantucket (Minor 1993; Trumbull 
1850, vol. 2: 444). Benjamin Church, in his history of Philip’s War, describes the Pequot 
as being “protected and defended” by the English (Church 1989: 82). One must also 
remember that the English may have aided the Pequots in the design of the fort. The most 
compelling evidence for a long term English presence is Barracks Field, however. 
Referenced in several land title deeds from the nineteenth-century, Bar acks Field is 
located in an area adjacent to the parking lot for the Mashantucket Pequot Museum and 
Research Center, in close proximity to the location of Monhantic Fort (Ledyard Deeds; 
Ledyard Probate 1861, vol. 2: 56-59). In Figure 5, one can see that it is also in the same 
probate record that reveals the name “Monhantic” for the area where the fort is located. 
The old Indian names are being reused to describe certain fields in these deeds; is it 
possible that Barracks Field denotes the location of an actual barracks? Such a place 




Figure 5: Deed Composite of 19th Century Farmsteads on the Reservation. Highlighted Areas Show 
Monhantic Pasture and Barracks Field 
 
Archaeologists from the Pequot Museum excavated the area of Barracks Field, 
Site 72-269, in the summer of 2008. A preliminary look at the artifacts recovered seems
to suggest that Barracks Field was not the location of any long term occupation during 
the seventeenth-century. Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the bottle glass, European flint, d 
other seventeenth-century artifacts retrieved from the excavation, and these spatial 
distributions reveal that artifacts that might belong to an occupation from the same time 
as the fort are few in number. They are also spatially scattered acrossthe site. This hardly 
seems like what one would expect from a site like a garrison where people would have 
lived on a semi-permanent basis. Alternatively, Barracks Field may have been a rallying 
point where English troops would have gone to meet up with the Pequots before heading 
off on an expedition. Of course, further excavation at the site and a more in-depth 
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analysis of the artifacts is required, but it seems fair to conclude that the documents 
demonstrate that English troops were present at and around the fort, but not for extended 
periods of time. This would make Monhantic Fort in as close of a proximity to the 
English as any other reservation community, but it does not support a conclusion that 
European influence at the fort was particularly intense. If the Pequots were slowly 
transitioning to specialized lithic activities in support of maintaining their arms instead of 
supplying residential activities as they once had done, it was probably not solely due to 
European influences. 
 








Figure 8: Other 17th Century Artifacts from 72-269 
 
The survey of the documentary record has suggested a high degree of European 
presence near the Fort; however, the preliminary archaeological evidence from the 
Barracks Field site points to nothing more than a staging location, where there would 
have been only occasional European presence, and this occasional presence does not 
seem to support a high degree of European influence at the Fort. Documents have also 
suggested that flint was likely not a scarce resource for the Pequots living at Monhantic 
Fort, and that it perhaps was viewed as separate to weaponry. The archaeologicl 
evidence from the Fort itself must now be examined to see if these interpretations of the 
documents find support in the artifacts, or if they contradict what the material record is 








CHAPTER IV  
METHODOLOGY 
 
Examining Raw Material Questions 
 With the documentary evidence in mind, the next step is the analysis of the flaked 
lithic material from Monhantic Fort. However, some methodological issues must be 
addressed at the outset. At first glance, the lithic material in question appears to consist 
solely of the European flint recovered at the site. However, as previously mentioned, 
Native people in the region did not solely use European flint for their gunflints; they also 
used chert and, less commonly, quartz raw materials in gunflint production. Also, the ite 
poses some temporal problems that must be acknowledged. Site 72-91 is a multi-
component site featuring deposits that date to the Archaic Period (9000 to 2700 BP) in 
Connecticut. The fort component is just one occupation of the land in the area. Besides 
the land having been part of a nineteenth-century farmstead, though, the fort occupai n 
is the only one not from the pre-contact era. Therefore, it seems likely that the bulk, if not 
the entirety of, other lithic materials recovered from 72-91 are from pre-contact periods 
and not from the fort, especially considering that these non-flint materials have resulted 
in tools that can be diagnostically tied to said periods, such as Neville points from the 
Middle Archaic. However, archaeologists studying gunflints have raisd some concern 
that Native gunflints appear to closely resemble pre-contact Native scrapers. 
Archaeologists more familiar with pre-contact tools seem more likely to identify tools as 
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scrapers based on their use wear when, in fact, these tools are actually gunflints (Hirst 
1991: 64). These identification problems could be exacerbated by gunflints made from 
non-flint materials like chert. 
 Evaluating the temporal placement of lithic materials is of the utmost importance 
to properly contextualize research into artifacts at the fort. Assumptions about the 
diminution of lithic technology and its restriction to gunflints and similar objects must be 
carefully considered to make sure it has empirical support rather than mythical s atus. To 
assess whether European flint is the only lithic material from the Fort, an analysis of three 
important features was undertaken. Three features in particular were examined: Features 
2, 34, and 92. These three features have all been established by Pequot Museum 
archaeologists as belonging to the Fort occupation. Feature 2 is the palisade trench, 
Feature 92 is the refuse/storage pit adjacent to one of the identified wigwam sites, and 
Feature 34 is a midden feature just outside the fort (McBride 2006). If they can be 
determined to be closed features -- that is, features containing only materials from the 
Fort occupation -- and if they contain other lithic raw materials, it will demonstrate that 
other stone sources were utilized by the Pequots for gunflint production. These results are 
considered below. 
 In order to investigate whether or not European flint was a scarce raw material, 
the weights of the gunflints, strike-a-lights, chunks, and cores were recorded t s e how 
extensively flint was knapped and what tools were most important. At sites like Aptucxet, 
the raw material was knapped until it was too small to be used, which Luedtke (1998: 43) 
believed indicated a scarcity of flint. If cores and cobbles have all been reduced to sizes 
too small to continue to utilize, their weights should reflect this and be smaller th n most 
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of the tools they were used to create, which would indicate raw material scarcity (Kujit et 
al. 1995: 117). Since the fort was occupied during a time of war and gunflints were vital 
to fighting, raw material scarcity would also mean that gunflints would be larg r nd 
weigh more than the less important strike-a-lights. Even with intensive tool rejuvenation, 
gunflints should still weigh more than strike-a-lights, as both classes of tools wu d show 
such intensive rejuvenation in the event of raw material constraints. This intensive 
rejuvenation of gunflints would be another indicator of raw material scarcity, with such 
activities reflected by a high percentage of gunflints featuring retouching. Native peoples 
may have also used more than one side of their gunflints as a working edge, something 
that would have been possible given how Native gunflints were manufactured. Thus, the 
presence of retouch and number of edges with use wear were recorded when examining 
the gunflints. 
 Weights and lengths of the flakes and angular debris were also recorded t  see if 
sizes reflect raw material scarcity. If the Fort was like Aptucxet, debitage would be so 
small that it could not have been used further; if there were no raw material scacity, a 
fair amount of debitage might be as large or larger than the gunflints. Should the debitage 
all be extremely small, the cores all unsuitable for continued use, the gunflints bigger 
than the strike-a-lights, and other raw materials exploited in addition to the flint, it would 
be safe to conclude that European flint was as scarce a resource for the Pequots living at 
Monhantic Fort as it was for those Native Americans living at places like Aptucxet. 
Weights and lengths of the debitage are also important when considering questions of 
production and maintenance, as flakes from the initial stages of production should be the 
largest and should weigh the most. Since the range of the balance scale used in the 
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analysis does not go lower than .01 g, flakes weighing less than that are counted as .01 g 
in order to be included. 
 
Production and Maintenance 
 To sort out the issues of production and maintenance of lithic tools at the Fort, 
further analysis of the flakes and debitage was required. Besides the work of Scott 
Williams (2011) on the gunflints, the previous extent of lithic analysis on the European 
flint from 72-91 had been to separate the lithics into several categories: flake, angular 
debris (including chunks), cores, cobbles, gunflints, and strike-a-lights. Another category 
of unidentified European flint was also present, the result of further excavation at 72-91. 
In order to answer the questions in this thesis, I identified flakes further bas d on the 
general typology outlined by Bradbury and Carr (1995: 101), taking into consideration 
the variations on the typology employed by the Pequot Museum. Primary flakes are 
defined as those flakes removed during the first stages of core reduction. These flak  
usually have cortex present and should display less than two scars from prior flake 
removals on their dorsal surfaces (Andrefsky 2005: 18, 106; Bradbury and Carr 1995: 
108). Tertiary flakes are defined as those flakes taken off during the finalization of a 
gunflint’s working edge; they show both faces but do not display use wear or evidence of 
retouching. Resharpening flakes are those featuring use wear; they almost always show 
both faces and may contain evidence of prior retouching (Inizan et al. 1999: 81, 155). A 
resharpening flake may be taken from a part of the gunflint’s working edge that does not 
contain use wear. Such resharpening flakes would look simply like tertiary flakes, and 
may be considered to be part of maintenance activities if found spatially with identifiable 
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resharpening flakes. Otherwise one must assume they are just tertiary flakes. Finally, 
secondary flakes are those taken off in the middle to late stages of production. For the
purposes of this study, flakes that cannot be positively identified as belonging to one of 
the other categories are assigned to this category. 
 For clarification, this thesis uses the definition for retouch put forth by Andrefsky 
(2005: 260): retouch is the modification of a tool’s working edge for the purpose of 
repairing or rejuvenating the tool. This is a markedly different definition for the term than 
is employed in Europe, where retouch is used to refer to removals taken from the blank to 
transform it into a tool (Inizan et al. 1999: 81). Furthermore, it should be noted that a 
flake that shows both faces, an aforementioned characteristic of resharpening and tertiary 
flakes, is one that was taken off from the working edge and retains a small lip on the end 
where the bifacial nature of the tool may still be seen. 
 To provide the data required to classify these flakes into these analytical 
categories, the debitage from the Fort was examined for the presence of use wear, the 
presence of cortex, the presence of retouch, the number of dorsal scars, and the number of 
faces. A microscopic analysis was employed to gauge these attributes. Positively 
identifying a flake as a primary flake necessitated it having both cortex and fewer than 
two dorsal scars; having just one these characteristics was not enough to say with 
certainty that it was one of the first flakes to be taken off the core. Resharp ning and 
tertiary flakes were identified as outlined above. 
 Determining if a specific area of the Fort was an area of lithic producti n or lithic 
maintenance depends on several things. In addition to a high percentage of flakes 
identified as primary flakes, production areas would have a high percentage of flakes 
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featuring attributes of conclusively identified primary flakes, those being cortex and less 
than two dorsal scars. They should also have larger average flake weights and lengths.
Another important factor in determining production areas is the presence of chunks, 
cores, and cobbles. As Steinberg (1996: 377) notes, the “unequivocal indicator of lithic 
production is the chunk.” More chunks in an area means it is more likely that lithic 
production took place there. These blocky chunks are generally referred to as angular 
shatter or angular debris, and they can be small or quite large, but share the characteristic 
of having no identifiable flake qualities such as platforms, dorsal/ventral surfaces, and 
bulbs of percussion (Andrefsky 2005: 84). Obviously, the presence of cores or cobbles 
indicates that someone was knapping tools nearby. If an area has several of these traits 
and lacks evidence of maintenance activities, it can be said to be a production space. 
 Maintenance spaces not only have high percentages of identified resharpening 
flakes, but they also have higher percentages of flakes with use wear, flakes with retouch, 
flakes with both faces, and flakes with greater than two dorsal scars. Maintenance areas 
should be comprised of flakes that yield a small average flake weight and a small average 
flake length, as opposed to production spaces. If Williams (2011) is correct about lithic 
specialization at the Fort, production spaces should be limited to only a few areas, and 
maintenance areas should not be numerous, if present at all. 
 To facilitate analysis, the fort has been divided into eleven spatial areas to see 
which ones might be production areas and which ones contain maintenance activities. 
These eleven areas and their locations in the Fort can be seen in Figure 9. The zones are 
identified as follows: 1 and 10: midden areas, meaning areas containing one or more 
midden/refuse pit features; 2: the forge; 6: the fort entrance; 3, 8, and 11: bastions; 5 and 
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9: identified wigwam sites; and 4 and 7: currently unknown. These areas were divided 
based on my ideas of different locations at the fort, developed from interpretations of site 
maps, artifact distributions, and conversations with Pequot Museum archaeologists. 
Therefore, when making conclusions about a given area, any lithics recovered from units 
directly adjacent to them will be given consideration in the event that these spatial
segregations are just “best estimates” based on excavation methodology. However, unl ss 
something is explicitly stated to be an adjacent lithic, the data only include those li ics 
found in a given area.  
In order to provide more accurate counts for the various areas, the number of 
debitage per square meter was calculated for each of the areas. This figure was then used 
to calculate an estimated number of debitage for those areas that have less than 90% 
excavation. This step standardizes debitage counts in the areas and shows which areas 
have the most lithic activity. A strict density for the areas was not be calculated, as the 




Figure 9: Site Map of Monhantic Fort with Areas Highlighted 
 
 
Flint and Weaponry 
 The spatial locations of objects of weaponry are investigated as well to se where 
they occur in relation to gunflints and European flint debitage. If gunflints and flint occur 
in close association with weapons, they may have been viewed as extensions of those 
weapons. If they are spatially distributed without any pattern or are spatially separated 
















something that only became a weapon once fixed into a flintlock firearm. Alternativ ly, if 
no spatial distributions of weapons can be discerned other than being randomly scattered 
throughout the fort, it may be impossible to glean any further insight into Native at itudes 
about gunflints and their relations to weapons. However, if lithic materials other than 
European flint can be associated with the late seventeenth-century occupation of the fort, 
the distribution of these tools and debitage can be directly compared to that of flint, as a 









CHAPTER V  
THE DATA 
 
 At this point, we have seen the historical context for the Monhantic Fort site, the 
Mashantucket Pequot as a tribe, and gunflints in the seventeenth-century. As the Pequot 
were fighting with the colony of Connecticut against the Narragansetts, gunflints would 
have been a vital tool. Past research seems to indicate that European flint may have been 
a scarce raw material and that production and maintenance of gunflints and other lithic 
tools may have been a specialized activity at the fort. The documents do not seem to 
suggest that scarcity was a concern for the Pequot, and while they indicate that Europeans 
may have been present at the reservation, the preliminary evidence from the Barracks 
Field site does not support any intense English presence, but merely occasional presence 
when soldiers rendezvoused at the fort before heading off on expeditions. The lack of 
intense presence means that there would not have been any great external pressures to 
adopt lithic specialization. 
 In the previous chapter, I outlined the methodology for how the questions 
surrounding the fort were answered archaeologically. In this chapter, the results of the 
analysis are presented to facilitate an interpretation of the lithic assemblage. First, I 
consider whether European flint was the only raw material present through the analysis to 
find closed features. After that, I present the data from the lithics at the site, starting with 
the tools and ending with the flakes and other debitage. Finally, I provide data on the 
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weaponry from the site along with any conclusions about whether a relationship between 
the weapons and flint can be seen. 
 
Closed Features Analysis 
 Three features -- 2, 34, and 92 -- were examined to see if they were closed 
features. Each feature contained hundreds of lithic artifacts. The table below shows the 
respective counts: 
Table 1:  Lithic Contents of Features 
 
Feature 2 34 92 
European Flint 47 25 144 
Chert 0 58 0 
Argillite 61 121 0 
Quartz 460 137 66 
Quartzite 275 37 32 
TOTAL 843 378 242 
 
          
Feature 2 is the palisade trench from the Fort; it contained mostly quartz and quartzite. 
Each raw material type had flakes and tools ranging from 10 centimeters below th  
surface to 95 centimeters below the surface. Features 34, a midden in Area Ten, and 92, a 
refuse/storage pit in Area Five, both had flakes and tools of the various raw material 
types ranging from five centimeters below surface to over a meter down. All three 
features had pre-contact projectile points and bifaces in the same levels as European flint. 
It seems as though lithic material from multiple time periods ended up jumbled in all of 
these features. Even Feature 92, with its discrete depositional episodes, had pre-contact 
lithics like Archaic period Neville points directly associated with flint. Whoever filled 
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and perhaps churned the pit in each time was obviously not taking care to ensure 
culturally modified rocks from the past were kept out, much to our disappointment today.  
Additionally, none of the lithics from any of these features was identified as a 
scraper, so there is little chance that a chert or quartz gunflint has been misidentified as 
Hirst (1991) warns is possible. Only these three features from the site could have been 
called closed features with any degree of confidence, and this analysis indicates that none 
of them actually are. The jumbled nature of these features and the fort at large precludes 
any other lithic raw material from conclusively being associated with the fort occupation. 
Coupled with the fact that gunflints of no other material were recovered, and considering 
the apparent diminishing state of stone tool technologies at the time of King Philip’s War, 
it is reasonable to conclude that Pequot Museum archaeologists were correct in th ir 
assumption that the European flint is the only raw material being used to produce flaked 
stone tools at Monhantic Fort. At least, it can be considered to be this way for this 
analysis until further refinements are possible. 
 
Gunflints, Strike-a-lights, and More 
 The analysis of the lithic assemblage from Monhantic Fort yielded some 
interesting results. In total, 45 gunflints were identified. This total was comprised of 35 
bifacial gunflints and 10 spall gunflints. Six of these gunflints could not be examined 
further as they had gone missing since arriving at the museum. Table 2, located on th  
page 50, displays the information on the gunflints. None of the gunflints displayed any 
evidence of use wear on multiple sides. Four of the gunflints were located in Feature 34, 
while Features 77 and 92 each contained one gunflint, respectively. They ranged in 
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weight from 0.23g to 5.62g, although the smallest whole gunflint weighed 1.16g. The 
average weight of all of the gunflints was 2.41g; the average weight of only the whol
gunflints was 3.07g. Figure 10 shows an example of a Native bifacial gunflint, while 




Table 2: Gunflints 
 
Inventory # Tag ID Unit Area Use Wear Retouch Fragment Weight (g)
312 Gunflint N1E0 adjacent to 9 Yes No Whole 1.16
948 Gunflint N29E4 10 Yes Yes Fragment 1.86
2933 Spall S12W9 7 No No Whole 4.21
4150 Spall S14W29 6 No No Fragment 1.1
4176 Gunflint S14W31 6 Yes No Fragment 2.75
5700.01 Spall N8W5 9 No No Fragment 3.46
5733.02 Gunflint N8W6 9 Yes Yes Whole 5.62
5733.02 Gunflint N8W6 9 Yes Yes Fragment 0.8
6359.01 Gunflint N36W5 adjacent to 10 No No Fragment 1.91
6727 Gunflint S15W24 6 No No Whole 2.77
7157 Gunflint N9W35 N/A No Yes Whole 2.91
7394 Gunflint N35W57 4 Yes No Fragment 1.94
7494 Gunflint N37W59 3 Yes No Fragment 3.58
7706.01 Gunflint N39W57 adjacent to 2+3 Yes No Fragment 1.67
7858 Gunflint N32E8 10 Yes Yes Whole 1.87
8769 Gunflint S16W24 6 Yes Yes Whole 2.4
9050 Gunflint S18W29 6 Yes No Whole 3.48
9590.01 Blade N39W61 2 No No Whole 1.47
9700 Spall N37W62 2 Yes Yes Whole 3.5
9749 Gunflint N38W63 1 Yes No Whole 2.22
11136 Gunflint N27W28 5 Yes No Fragment 0.23
11402 Gunflint N39W59 3 No No Whole 2
12885.01 Spall N34W32 5 No No Whole 3.77
13109 Spall N34W31 5 Yes Yes Whole 3.02
14370 Spall N32W29 5 No Yes Whole 4.89
14514 Gunflint N23W25 5 No No Whole 4.78
15570 Gunflint N26W33 5 Yes Yes Fragment 1.46
16226 Gunflint N39W24 adjacent to 5 Yes Yes Fragment 0.8
18976 Gunflint N31W57 4 No No Whole 2.98
19444 Gunflint N39W48 adjacent to 4 Yes Yes Fragment 3.25
20981 Gunflint S16W6 7 No No Fragment 0.37
21001 Gunflint S17W18 adjacent to 6 No No Fragment 0.89
21018 Gunflint S17W18 adjacent to 6 Yes Yes Fragment 1.41
22554 Gunflint N27E6 10 Yes Yes Whole 3.4
23699 Gunflint S4E10 adjacent to 7 No Yes Whole 2.2
20895 Gunflint S17W12 adjacent to 7 Yes Yes Fragment 0.19
7859 Gunflint N32E10 10 Yes Yes Whole 3.1
8783 European Flint S16W28 6 Yes No Fragment 1.96





Figure 10: Bifacial Gunflint, Inv# 8769 
 





Strike-a-lights were less numerous with only three recognized (Table 3). 
Table 3: Strike-a-lights 
 
Inventory # Tag ID Unit Area Weight (g) 
7316 Strike-a-light N26W20 adjacent to 5 4.48 
9965 Strike-a-light N41W60 2 0.57 
12519 Strike-a-light N30W29 5 2.65 
 
Two out of the three strike-a-lights, inventory #7316 and #12519, were whole. Only 
inventory #9965 was a fragment. It should be noted, however, that during his 
examination of the 44 pieces of unclassified European flint, Scott Williams believed that 
there were more than just three strike-a-lights. He identified thirteen other strik -a-lights 
amongst these 44 uncategorized pieces (Williams 2011: 34). In my analysis, I did not see 
any use wear on the thirteen in question to make me want to identify them as strike-a-
lights. In fact, I identified some of those thirteen objects as completely different things, 
from Native gunflints to resharpening flakes. Williams also failed to include inventory 
#7316 in his strike-a-light analysis (Figure 12). This artifact was not identified as 
anything. The average weight of the three strike-a-lights turned out to be 2.57g; if one 




Figure 12: Strike-a-light, Inv#7316 
 
 Archaeologists also recovered three cores from the Fort, one of which had broken 
into two pieces by the time it arrived in the museum, as well as two unmodified European 
flint cobbles (Table 4). Figure 13 shows an unmodified cobble and Figure 14 shows a 
core. 
Table 4: Cores and Cobbles 
 
Inventory 
# Tag ID Unit Area Weight (g) 
19221 Cobble N33W49 4 71.82 
19428 Cobble N37W52 4 176.8 
589 Core N11E1 adjacent to 9 21.1 
5925 Core N10W1 9 34.37 
5925 Core N10W1 9 6.42 




Figure 13: Unmodified Cobble, Inv#19428 
 




Flakes and Angular Debris 
 Flakes recovered from the fort comprised the bulk of the analysis. In total, 907 
flint flakes and other debitage were uncovered, including chunks and angular debris as 
well. Furthermore, the previously unclassified European flint was considered here as 
debitage and analyzed with the flakes. If determined to be a gunflint or other t ol, the 
artifact was examined differently, but otherwise is included in the debitage count. The 
only area completely devoid of any kind of lithic material was Area 8, although Area 11 
yielded only a meager three flakes. Table 5 provides the results of the analysis of the 
debitage attributes by area. Areas 1, 7, 9, and 10 have estimated numbers of flakes 
calculated for them in the table along with the actual number of flakes recoved, as they 
all have less than 90% excavation. The estimated numbers appear in the table in 
parentheses with the actual number of debitage recovered from said areas. This 
standardization means that I have divided the total recovered flakes by the percentage of 
excavation to generate an expected yield had everything been excavated. Tabl  6
provides the data on conclusively identified flake types; it also displays informati n on 
the extent of fragmentation in each area as well as each area’s average debitage per 
square meter. Figures 15-18 show examples of primary and resharpening flakes. 
 When calculating the average debitage per square meter for the areas, it became 
apparent that Area 2, the forge area, had a significantly higher average debitage count per 
square meter. To see if this higher count could indicate specialized lithic activities at the 
forge, additional statistics were run on the areas in the form of t-tests. Tables 7-14 show 




Figure 15: Primary Flake, Inv#19252.01 
 




Figure 17: Resharpening Flake, Inv#19063 
 
Figure 18: Ventral Surface of Inv#19063, Retention of the Bifacial Edge Seen Where Highlighted 
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Table 6: Identified Flake/Angular Debris Types  































































































































































































































































Table 7: Group Statistics For Flakes And Angular Debris, Comparing Forge Area With Other Areas 
Attribute Area N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
Forge 119 13.16 4.8249 0.4423
NotForge 613 12.069 6.0019 0.2424
Forge 119 0.684 1.00848 0.09245







































Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances






Table 9: Group Statistics For Flakes Only, Comparing Forge Area With Other Areas 
 
Attribute Area N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
Forge 73 12.596 4.8028 0.5621
NotForge 453 11.934 5.9452 0.2793
Forge 73 0.4604 0.5957 0.06972
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Table 11: Group Statistics For Flakes Only, Comparing The Two Wigwam Areas 
Attribute Area N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
5 206 10.194 5.3006 0.3693
9 88 13.449 6.6885 0.713
5 207 0.2889 0.47382 0.03293
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Table 13: Group Statistics For Non Feature Flakes Only, Comparing The Two Wigwam Areas 
 
Attribute Area N Mean Std. Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
5 131 12.443 4.7901 0.4815
9 95 15.232 6.1738 0.6334
5 132 0.4821 0.63676 0.05542







































Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
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t-test for Equality of Means





 To see if anything could be said about weapons and their relationship to flint, 
metal objects relating to hunting or weaponry were reviewed. Any items of hunting or 
weaponry in the eleven areas were noted and examined spatially; knives that had been 
classified as non-domestic tools were also included. Table 15 shows all of the metal 
artifacts of hunting and weaponry pertinent to this study. 
 
Table 15: Objects of Weaponry 
 
Unit Area Metal Type Tag ID Count 
N40W61 2 Iron Bird Shot 1 
N40W60 2 Iron Cock Screw 1 
N41W61 2 Iron Cock Screw 2 
N37W61 2 Lead Shot, 4mm 1 
N43W61 2 Iron Knife 1 
N43W61 2 Iron Knife 1 
N38W59 3 Copper Sheet 2 
N38W59 3 Iron Projectile Point 1 
N39W57 3 Iron Cock Screw 1 
N32W56 4 Copper Projectile Point 1 
N33W52 4 Iron Wheel Lock Pyrite 1 
N36W57 4 Lead Shot 1 
N32W29 5 Iron Fishhook 3 
N32W29 5 Iron Gun Worm 1 
N26W32 5 Lead Bullet 1 
N32W29 5 Lead Shot, 5mm 2 
N28W33 5 Lead Shot 1 
N33W27 5 Iron Knife 1 
N32W29 5 Iron Knife 1 
S15W30 6 Iron Gun Trigger 1 
S17W1 7 Iron Fishhook 1 
S12W10 7 Iron Knife 2 
N8W6 9 Lead Ball Shot 1 
N7W1 9 Lead Shot, 6mm 1 
N27E3 10 Lead Musket Ball 1 




Almost every area contained some kind of weaponry. The only area that 
contained any kind of cluster of these objects is Area 2. Almost all of the weapons found 
in this area were located in a group of three units right outside the northwest bastion. 
However, it would make sense for a large cluster of metal artifacts to appear in this area, 
as it is right in the heart of the area identified as a forge. 
No other area contains a significant cluster of weapons. Area Five contains the 
largest amount of weaponry, but this is solely due to the fact that seven of the artifacts 
were discarded or left in Feature 92. Even metal artifacts like the fishhooks, which relate 
to subsistence activities in the same way firearms relate to hunting, were located apart 
from everything. The spatial scattering of weaponry indicates that there was no set place 
where they were being stored or discarded; unfortunately, this also prevents any 
conclusions being drawn about their relationship with lithics. 
However, when looking through metal artifacts at the fort for these objects of 
hunting and weaponry, there was something quite interesting in the distribution of molten 
lead: 34% of all the lead recovered from the fort occurred in Area Five, including two 
melted pieces, and two more molten lead artifacts were located very close by, within 
three meters of the area. No other area contained molten lead objects, but lead shot was 
found in several areas, Area Six had two lead items related to clothing, and a lead bar w s





Table 16: Lead Artifacts 
Unit Area Tag ID 
N37W61 2 Shot, 4mm 
N37W57 3 Unidentified Lead 
N38W57 3 Unidentified Lead 
N36W57 4 Shot 
N26W32 5 Lead Bullet 
N29W28 5 Molten Lead 
N25W28 5 Unidentified Lead 
N29W31 5 Unidentified Lead 
N28W33 5 Shot 
N32W29 5 Shot, 5mm 
N32W29 5 Sprue 
N32W29 5 Unidentified Lead 
N32W29 5 Molten Lead 
N32W29 5 Shot, 5mm 
S14W27 6 Pendant 
S14W23 6 Shoe Buckle 
S9W9 7 Unidentified Lead 
S17W12 7 Shot 
N8W6 9 Shot 
N7W1 9 Shot, 6mm 
N6E1 9 Shot, 3.5mm 
N29E6 10 Cast Shot 
N27E3 10 Musket Ball 
N24W1 adjacent to 10 Lead Bar 
N20W24 adjacent to 5 Molten Lead 
N20W35 adjacent to 5 Molten Lead Shot 
N10W33 N/A Unidentified Lead 








CHAPTER VI  
DISCUSSION 
 
Readily Available Flint 
 It would appear that scarcity of flint was not an issue that the Mashantucket 
Pequots living at Monhantic Fort had to face. Both the archaeological and documentary 
evidence suggest that there was plenty to go around. Gunflints were certainly the most 
important flint tool for the Pequots living there; however, the strike-a-lights weighed 
more on average than the whole gunflints. Averages aside, the largest strike-a-light is 
almost as big as the largest gunflint, and the smallest strike-a-light is larger than one-third 
of the whole gunflints. Williams (2011: 65) also reported that in addition to flints for 
muskets and carbines, the Pequots at the fort made small gunflints specifically for pistols. 
Strike-a-lights would have been made from the tiniest pieces of flint that were unsuitable 
for even these pistol flints in a raw material constraint situation, which would have 
resulted in a pronounced difference between the average weights of these tools. While not 
as many strike-a-lights were recovered, the weights show that they were not b ing 
relegated to only the leftover pieces of flint, as would have been the case with gunflints 
as the priority in the context of raw material constraints.  
 The gunflints also do not point to the Pequots rejuvenating all of their flint tools 
until they could be used no longer. More than half of the gunflints from the fort lack any 
signs of retouching; 38% of the gunflints had never even been used. When the gunflints 
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did sport use wear, it was only ever on one side. This means that the Pequots were not 
forced into material saving measures like turning their gunflints in the lock. They did not 
need to gain extra use out of a single gunflint by giving it multiple working edges; it 
seems like they could simply just get a new one. 
 Additionally, many of the discarded flakes and chunks are large enough that 
someone could have used them to produce a serviceable flint. The data show that 6% of 
the flakes weigh more than the average gunflint weight, and 17% are larger than the 
smallest whole gunflint. As Kent (1983: 31) reminds us, “any piece of broken flint will 
serve to draw sparks from a hardened piece of steel.” If it was large enough to be used 
and could be given a working edge, it could be a gunflint. It is hard to believe that so 
many workable pieces would be discarded if flint was in short supply. The recoverd 
cores and cobbles also generate this reaction. One might not even expect any unmodified 
cobbles to be located if flint was scarce, but two were, and each probably could have 
been used to create several gunflints. The cores, while all worked to the point where only 
a small portion of the original surface remains, could also have been utilized furtherto 
produce flakes. 
 No other raw material types are apparently in play at the Fort, either. Unlike other 
Native forts, such as Fort Shantok, the Pequots did not feel the need to make use of the 
abundant local stone resources of chert and quartz to make gunflints. No gunflints made 
out of these other material types were identified, and nothing seems to suggest that any
tools were made out of these non-flint materials during the Fort occupation. European 
flint seems to have been readily available to the point where the Pequots did not consider 
making even one gunflint out of local stone. Factor in that the records of the War Council 
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show that the Pequots were not being supplied with flint as they were with guns, powder, 
and shot, and that their access to flint was not being controlled like said items, and one 
can see that the Pequots were definitely not wanting for raw material. It w s available to 
them not only as a trade good or a spoil of war but also in rivers and harbors as leftover 
ship ballast. 
 
Looking at Production and Maintenance Across the Site 
 In order to clear up whether or not lithic production and maintenance at the fort 
was a specialized activity, and where such activities took place, focus must be turned to 
analysis of the flakes and debitage. One evaluated attribute was how many of the flakes 
in a given area were fragmented. Some archaeologists believe that a large number of 
broken flakes at a particular locus indicates production of lithic tools, and at the fort, 
almost every area contained a high percentage of fragmented flakes (Sullivan and Rozen 
1985). However, it seems more reasonable in this context to side with those 
archaeologists who believe that a high percentage of broken flakes better indicates a high 
degree of trampling (Steinberg 1996: 377). One must remember that this was not a quarry 
site where raw material was obtained and knapped; it had people living and going about 
their daily activities, often in the context of a confined space provided by large 
fortifications. Therefore, the fort would have been a high traffic area for Pequots living 
on the reservation, and it is reasonable to assume a high degree of trampling as a 
corollary. I believe that this best explains the high percentages of fragmented flakes in all 




The identification of production and maintenance spaces can proceed first through 
an examination of the rest of the attributes of the flakes in each area. Area One, the 
midden area next to the forge, is the least excavated area at Monhantic Fort. Only 8% of 
this large area was excavated by Pequot Museum archaeologists, and most of the 
excavation in this area was done through test pits, not excavation units. Thus it has one of 
the smallest amounts of flakes of any of the areas. However, the estimated number of 
flakes for this area is quite large, and if it reflected the reality of what as happening, 
would suggest a lot of lithic activity. At first glance, Area One seems like one of the best 
candidates for a production space. It has the highest percentages of flakes with l s than 
two dorsal scars and identified primary flakes out of all of the investigated areas of the 
fort. It also yielded a core and has the second highest percentage of chunks. 
 However, other attributes make declaring Area One a production space a 
complicated proposition. While it has all those indicators of a production space, it also 
has the lowest average weight of flakes of all the areas, one of the smallest average 
lengths of flakes, and 4% of the flakes found within are identified resharpening flakes. It 
seems that while lithic production is certainly happening in this area, maintenance 
activities are also taking place. Perhaps this area is the heart of all lithic technology at 
Monhantic Fort, where a specialist was making gunflints and repairing damaged ones. 
However, turning to the other areas, this does not appear to be the case. 
 Area Two, the forge, is almost completely excavated. It has more flakes but 
presents the same problems as Area One: some attributes, like 45% of the flakes having 
cortex and 40% of the debitage being chunks, point strongly toward production. Still, 
resharpening flakes were recovered from this area, and these not only show use wear but 
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also both faces and retouch. The results of the t-tests (Tables 7-10) also show that the
flakes and other debitage from the forge are not significantly different from the rest of the 
areas at the fort; the mean weights and lengths are very similar, even more so wh n one 
only considers the flakes, with a two tailed significance of .779 for the weights and .366 
for the lengths. These results do not seem to champion the forge as a specialized 
production area, despite its high amount of debitage per square meter. 
Area Three, the northwest bastion, displays evidence for both production and 
maintenance as well, with the largest percentage of chunks and the second largest 
percentage of identified resharpening flakes. Very few flakes were recovered there, but 
this probably has more to do with the fact that Area Three is comprised of only 17 units; 
as a bastion it is one of the smallest areas. However, when one looks at the average 
number of flakes per meter square, Area Three is second only to Area Two. 
The number of flakes recovered from Area Three is also sizeable when one 
compares it to the other bastions, Areas Eight and Eleven. Area Eight yielded no flakes of 
any kind and Area Eleven only contained three flakes. As these two areas are pretty much 
devoid of lithic activity, Area Three becomes somewhat odd. It is the only bastion to 
contain substantial lithic material, to the point where one can say production and 
maintenance both occurred. This is equally as strange, though, since it seems unusual for 
a Pequot to decide to knap from atop a bastion. A more reasonable interpretation might 
be to say that lithics occur in Area Three because it is sandwiched between Areas Two 
and Four and is adjacent to a possible rear entrance to the Fort. Due to the nature of 




The other midden area, Area Ten, has undergone more excavation than Area One. 
The attributes for this midden seem to be the opposite of the other, featuring quite large 
average flake weights and lengths and also the highest percentage of identified 
resharpening flakes. Another area that samples the outside of the Fort is Area Six, the 
main entrance. This area seems to primarily be a production space, with the highest
percentage of flakes with cortex, the largest average flake length, ad the second largest 
average flake weight. Again, though, a few resharpening flakes were identified here. In 
other words, not much lithic activity happened at the entrance, but someone did produce 
tools and resharpen them in the vicinity. The activity here and at Area Ten is important t  
note because it suggests that production and maintenance occurred not just inside the fort 
but everywhere around it as well. The forge may have looked like a possible area of 
specialization to Williams, but he lumped areas One through Four into one forge area. He 
did not examine the lithics from Areas Six and Ten, so the fact of lithic production tak ng
place outside the Fort away from domestic spaces led him to posit specialization. Lithic 
activity from outside the fort seems less odd once it is realized that it occurred 
everywhere outside the fort and not just in one particular location like the forge. 
The two wigwam sites, Areas Five and Nine, are marked by low percentages of 
chunks and resharpening activities. They also have similar percentages of flakes with l ss 
than two dorsal scars and a similar average flakes per meter square. However, Area Nine 
did have two cores, more flakes with cortex than Area Five, and a higher average flake 
weight and length. The t-test comparing the two wigwam areas demonstrate that these 
higher flake weights and lengths make Area Nine significantly different from Area Five, 
with a two tailed significance for the weights and lengths at 0.000 (see Tables 11 and 12). 
73 
 
One might be tempted to attribute this significant difference to the storage/refuse pit 
feature, Feature 92, found in Area Five. Features at Monhantic Fort were excavated with 
finer mesh (1/8 inch as opposed to 1/4 inch), and many of the smaller flakes from Area 
Five were recovered from soil samples taken from Feature 92. Area Nine was also less 
excavated (49%, compared to Area Five’s 90% excavation). The smaller flakes from 
Feature 92 and the greater extent of excavation in Area Five seem like they would form 
the perfect catalyst for creating the significant difference between the wigwam sites. 
However, even when one excludes the flakes from the features, the t-tests still show a
significant difference of .004 (see Tables 13 and 14).  
Looking at the mean flake weights and lengths, one can see that Area Nine is not 
just different from the other wigwam at Area Five, but also from the forge and the other 
areas around the fort. Area Five, on the other hand, is very similar to all of the other 
areas. Area Nine, then, is the outlier at Monhantic Fort; the flakes recovered from that 
wigwam are substantially heavier and longer than the flakes recovered everywhere else. 
It also is the exception that demonstrates the fact that the fort lacks specialized lithic 
production areas. The differences seen in Area Nine are associated with a household 
context, not a professional one, and thus they can be attributed to differences in 
household use. 
It would appear that particular households were focused on particular activities. 
Area Nine certainly focused more on the production of gunflints, as one can see from the 
higher degree of these larger and heavier flakes. Area Five seems like it is focused on 
lead, as it had all of the recovered pieces of molten lead located in and around it, as well 
as the majority of lead artifacts from the entire site. This division of laborm ng 
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households was probably enacted to facilitate a supply of necessary items (i.e. shot and 
gunflints) for warriors so that each person did not have to produce or acquire every single 
thing they would need for an expedition. Admittedly, this is a provisional and rather 
functional interpretation to account for the differences at this time. 
It, however, does not necessarily mean that lithic technology at Monhantic Fort 
was specialized. Certainly, the analysis of the flakes and debitage demonstrates that no 
individuals at the fort had the sole job to produce and maintain stone tools. The 
household at Area Nine was likely responsible for a good deal of the gunflints made at 
the fort, with its focus on lithics. One must keep in mind, though, that the other areas of 
the fort (besides awkward places to knap such as the bastions) all have similar densities 
of lithic material as Area Nine, save for the forge, but the t-tests showthat the forge and 
these other areas are all comprised of similar flakes. Factor in also that they ll have 
flakes with attributes reflecting production activities, such as cortex, as well as conclusive 
identified primary flakes from the initial stages of production. In the same vein, 
maintenance flakes are similarly found all over, showing people maintaining tools in the 
various locations of the fort. It seems that there was a generalization to lithic production 
and maintenance at the fort. However, certain households were focused on particular 
activities to provide needed items for the benefit of all. The fact that the household in 
Area Nine was more geared up for gunflint production does not negate the evidence that 
people produced and maintained tools in the rest of the fort, and its similar density of 
lithics does not seem to heighten its status over the other areas. 
The areas around and within Monhantic Fort suggest that production and 
maintenance activities occurred throughout the interior as well as the exterior of the 
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palisaded village. The data indicate that certain households seem to have been tasked 
with carrying out certain activities, and the household at Area Nine was focu ed on lithic 
production, likely to help provide an excess of gunflints for Pequot warriors. However, 
lithic production was not restricted to this household, and one can still see a 
generalization to lithics at the fort. The Pequot living within were still involved in the 
practice of making and maintaining lithic tools the same way they had been in the pre-
contact era. They made gunflints and strike-a-lights as they needed them, and this action 
was done seemingly wherever it was convenient at the particular moment; that is, any 
location in and around the fort where someone could produce gunflints easily was 
utilized. Judging from the amounts of flakes (or estimated amounts, as the case may be) 
as well as the average flakes per unit, this usually meant knapping around one’s wigwam 
or by the middens. The need for gunflints was probably lessened due to the output of 
these tools from the household tasked with focusing on them, but it did not totally 
disappear and caused the production and maintenance one sees represented by the 
majority of the lithics at the site. Maintenance of tools was less common than production, 
although it did take place in every area of the fort, and maintenance activities were likely 
even more generalized as the lithic household at Area Nine had a lower percentage of 
resharpening flakes than most areas. The low extent of lithic maintenance activities 
throughout the Fort also lends more credibility to the idea that the Pequots had a steady 
supply of flint and did not have to resort to intensive rejuvenation of gunflints. 
 
Lithics in a Non-Military Context 
 Obviously, the lithics at Monhantic Fort are situated in a wartime context. 
Understanding the state of lithic technology for the Mashantucket Pequot in the late 
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seventeenth-century necessitates a discussion of whether or not the lithics at Monh ntic 
Fort are representative of the Pequot in general or if they are unique to the fort’s military 
context. To examine this issue, the lithics from the non fort household at site 72-34A can 
be consulted. This site is a Pequot household on the reservation that is roughly 
contemporaneous with the fort, albeit with a longer period of occupation (McBride 2011, 
personal communication). 
 European flint is practically nonexistent at 72-34A, with only three gunflints, a 
strike-a-light, and two flakes recovered during archaeological investigations there. 
Production simply does not seem to have taken place there, although maintenance of 
tools is evident from extensive retouching of the gunflints. What the lithics at this si e 
speak more to is raw material. Monhantic Fort has shown that if the Pequot were willing 
and able, plenty of raw material could be had in the form of ballast flint, as well as 
through opportunities to acquire nodules through trade. In a non-military context, 
however, the need for gunflints is not so severe. Guns would no longer frequently be 
needed for war expeditions; they would now solely be utilized for hunting activities. 
 This would in turn have greatly reduced the demand for gunflints, and the need 
for lithic production. The Pequot at 72-34A thus seem to have decided against expending 
the time and energy required to procure ballast flint, and instead of purchasing nodules, 
they skipped straight to the finished product and purchased spalls. Two out of the three 
gunflints are spall type gunflints that one would expect to receive from an English 
specialist. The other gunflint is a Native made bifacial flint, but it likely was not 
purchased like the other two since it is the honey-colored French flint and not the grayish 
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English variety that the spalls are. In comparison, the gunflints and debitage at he fort 
resulted from nodules of both varieties.  
The people living at this household also decided against expending time and 
energy on strike-a-lights, utilizing a piece of angular debris instead in that cap city. They 
also utilized the raw material saving technique of utilizing multiple sides of their 
gunflints, keeping one side for gunflint use and having another side as a strike-a-light. It 
seems like they were unwilling to pay for two different tools when they could buy one 
and use it for both purposes. 
It seems that when it was more efficient to make their own flint tools (like in a 
wartime context when demand for these tools would be high), the Pequot expended time, 
energy, and resources on acquiring nodules by trade or through gathering ballast flint. 
When they made their own tools, they would engage with production and maintenance as 
they had in the pre-contact era, albeit with exceptions to prove the rule like a household 
that concentrated on gunflint production. Individuals, not specialists, would create the 
tools they needed as they needed them. In a non-military, peace-time context, however, it 




 The lithic assemblage from Monhantic Fort tells us several things about the 
Mashantucket Pequot during King Philip’s War. First, it reveals that the flint resource 
was not only accessible to them but also available in large enough quantities that no 
special considerations had to be put into place to conserve it or to substitute other raw 
materials. Either the colonial government in Connecticut did not feel the need to control
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access to flint as they did with guns, which seems likely given the lack of attention flint 
received in the records of the War Council and other documents, or the Pequots were 
skilled enough to maneuver the politics governing weaponry and acquire flint with ease, 
either through trade or the acquisition of ballast in rivers, to the point where the War 
Council decided it was useless to try to control access to the raw material. Whatever the 
case, at this point in time they were in a sound place economically speaking with regard
to European flint, and the raw material scarcity that probably affected those living at 
places such as Aptucxet posed no concerns for the Mashantucket Pequot. 
 It is well established that Native peoples retained pre-contact methods of 
manufacture when it come to the production of stone tools like gunflints in the 
seventeenth century. The Monhantic Fort site shows that they also retained their pre-
contact practices of bifacial manufacture, with the production and maintenance of 
European flint tools remaining a non-specialized activity on the whole. Production of 
tools comprised the majority of lithic activity at the site, with maintenance employed 
occasionally, probably based on how much time a particular Pequot had, given that 
Native people before colonial intrusion had increased retouch activities while scaling 
back on the amount of time and energy they had to give to lithics (Jeske 1992: 469). 
Lithic activities mostly occurred around the home, or by a midden where flakes and 
debitage could be out of the way and easily disposed of, but production and maintenance 
of tools did happen everywhere in and around the fort. With only occasional European 
presence at the fort, any influence that might have altered the way the Pequots practiced 
lithic tool making was virtually non-existent.  
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 How, then, do these interpretations speak to the larger issues discussed in Chapter 
One?  The fact that the Mashantucket Pequot were able to procure flint in quantities tha  
assured no scarcity would have to be dealt with can be related to several things. First and 
foremost, it shows how savvy they were when it came to traversing the colonial 
economy. They could acquire this important material through several avenues, and they 
knew these avenues well enough that they did not have to obtain flint from the War 
Council in the same way that they had with regards to powder and shot. Mason was 
wrong about the Pequot being ill equipped to fight the war, at least where flint was 
concerned.  
The lack of control that the War Council had regarding the supply of flint and its 
acquisition by the Pequot also speaks to another issue: the desire of the colonial 
authorities to keep the Pequot subordinated. Controlling Native groups was a chief 
concern in New England, and in areas where they did not have direct control, colonial 
governments made sure to place officials like overseers on the reservation in orderto 
monitor and influence the way things were (Den Ouden 2005: 5). Keeping the amount of 
real Native threats to a minimum was of paramount importance to the colony of 
Connecticut, which was why they and other colonies enacted legislation and directives to 
prevent Native peoples from receiving weaponry and ammunition unless under the most 
controlled of circumstances. The lack of controls on flint, a vital component of flintlock 
weaponry, is interesting to note. 
The lithic activities at Monhantic Fort also seem to express Native identity in he 
same way that the bifacial nature of the Pequot gunflints signals their identty. The 
concept of specialization was not something new and alien to the Pequot. After all, they 
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had a specialized activity area for the production of metal tools in the forge, pehaps with 
their own blacksmith working there. This was obviously a seventeenth-century 
development for a people who had no previous knowledge of or access to metal at all. 
Gunflints were a new tool that they similarly had no previous knowledge of, and in the 
arms of European settlers gunflints were a tool made by specialists. It might have been 
simple for the Pequot to adopt this specialized practice when producing gunflints. 
However, the Pequot did have knowledge and skill in lithic technology, and they 
negotiated the introduction of this new tool by attaching to it these traditional ways of 
producing and maintaining similar tools of stone material. In this way, gunflints made on 
the reservation ceased being solely European and became a Native tool. Like making 
gunflints bifacially, the application of non-specialized traditions of lithic production and 
maintenance to gunflints is an expression of Native practices tied both to their past and to 
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